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Abstract
Growing concern for individual privacy, driven by an in-
creased public awareness of the degree to which many
of our electronic activities are tracked by interested third
parties (e.g. Google knows what I am thinking before I
finish entering my search query), is driving the develop-
ment anonymizing technologies (e.g. Tor). The coming
mass migration to IPv6 as the primary transport of In-
ternet traffic promises to make one such technology, end-
to-end host based encryption, more readily available to
the average user. In a world where end-to-end encryp-
tion is ubiquitous, what can replace the existing models
for network intrusion detection? How can network ad-
ministrators and operators, responsible for securing net-
works against hostile activity, protect a network they can-
not see? In an encrypted world, signature based event
detection is unlikely to prove useful. In order to se-
cure a network in such an environment, without trampling
the privacy afforded to users by end-to-end encryption,
our threat detection model needs to evolve from signa-
ture based detection to a heuristic model that flags de-
viations from normal network-wide behavior for further
investigation. In this paper we present such a heuristic
model and test its effectiveness for detecting intrusions
in an entirely encrypted network environment. Our re-
sults demonstrate the network intrusion detection system’s
ability to monitor a network carrying only host-to-host en-
crypted traffic. This work indicates that a broad perspec-
tive change is required. Network security models need
to evolve from endeavoring to define attack signatures to
describing what the network looks like under normal con-
ditions and searching for deviations from the norm.
1 Introduction
In computer networks, specifically Internet Protocol (IP)
networks, hosts or devices are identified by unique iden-
tifiers. These labels, as of the writing of this paper, are
predominantly of a form dictated by the IPv4 standard. In
this standard a network connected device’s is described
by a sequence of four numbers mapping its connectiv-
ity to the network. For instance, as in sub-netting prac-
tices, the last number of the identification sequence in-
dicates the device as a member of a small section of the
whole IP network (a subnet). The whole sequence is re-
ferred to as an IP address and the individual numbers are
“octets,” so called since they can take on values in the
range [0, 28]. Since this addressing scheme only affords
4.3 billion unique identifiers, a single IP network would
be limited to that many devices.
Appropriately so, the most well-known IP network is
the Internet. Since its inception it has grown exponen-
tially into the ubiquitous connectivity medium that it is
today. Furthermore, the worldwide explosion of the pop-
ularity of wired, wireless and mobile connected devices
has exhausted the 4.3 billion unique identifiers. Histor-
ically, solutions to the limitations of addressing Inter-
net connected devices have been implemented with suc-
cess, e.g. network address translation (NAT) and variable-
length subnet masks, as referenced previously. Such prac-
tices have directed the evolution of common network
topologies towards those as illustrated in Figure 1. Confi-
dential communication between devices on separate local
area networks (LAN’s) over the Internet, has thus been
mostly confined to IP tunneling and virtual private net-
work (VPN) configurations.
The transition to the more expansive addressing scheme
IPv6 generates almost 100 orders of magnitude more
available unique identifiers, thus negating the need for
schemes such as NAT to separate potentially identical ad-
dresses. If the current Internet were fully realized con-
verted to the IPv6 standard, every connected device would
have its own unique public address. In this setting di-
rect confidential communication between devices is vi-
able, through host-to-host encryption, since no two hosts
will have the same address. While this is a boon to confi-
dentiality goals, it is a detriment to current network secu-
rity measures: [3],[6],[25], and [19].
Intrusion detection systems (IDS), and particularly net-
work IDS (NIDS) rely on information extracted from
packet traffic on the LAN to recognize breaches of secu-
rity policies and issue alerts to administrators or network
management software. Current NIDS utilize much data
available in the packet, including the protocols and ports
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employed during a conversation, to compute statistics or
generate patterns for analysis: [18],[1],[17], and [20]. Im-
plementation of host-to-host encryption would prohibit a
NIDS access to such information, limiting it to only the
information in the packet headers, e.g. source and desti-
nation addresses, payload length, and time to live. Traffic
analysis on this limited data is difficult and research in this
area is ongoing: [21],[14],[12], and [13]. Table 1 serves
to illustrate the typical intrusion detection rates for current
NIDS.
As can be seen, few of the techniques perform with
high detection percentages and none perform well for all
OS/attack vector pairings. These techniques are largely
separable into two classes: expert/heuristic systems and
learning/data driven systems. The two approaches, while
independently feasible for some applications, are not
broadly applicable to the IDS task. In this effort we ex-
amine these two approaches via two pairings: expert in-
spired statistical analysis and data driven heuristic defini-
tions. The paper is organized thus: Section 2 describes
past and current efforts on this issue, Section 3 expands
on the problem and our efforts are discussed in Section 4.
2 Related Work
2.1 Network Monitoring and Network Data
Confidentiality
The fundamental challenge of network intrusion detec-
tion in the presence of ubiquitous encryption is the in-
herent tension between competing security concerns: on
the one hand, enterprise network users maintain a legiti-
mate desire to protect the confidentiality of their commu-
nications over the network while on the other hand, net-
work administrators are tasked with the responsibility of
ensuring that internal network and computing resources
are not compromised by the intrusion of unauthorized ac-
tivity. Figure 1 depicts the challenge posed to an enter-
prise network administrator in the presence of encrypted
user traffic through the network. The NIDS in the figure
will not have access to information in the encrypted pay-
load of the packets transported via the IPsec tunnel. In
recent years the desire to protect both the confidentiality
of data in transit and corporate resources from intrusion
has intensified. Applications and protocols offering trans-
parent encryption of user traffic have become increasingly
available. Because RFC4301 defines the implementation
of IPsec as mandatory for all IPv6 nodes, the migration to
IPv6 as the primary network transport protocol promises
to make transparent encryption an even more ubiquitous
reality. At the same time, occurrences of malicious cyber
activity and hostile intrusions into private networks and
computing resources are on the rise.
Figure 1: Common Enterprise Network Topology
2.2 Prior Approaches to the Problem
A number of different approaches have been proposed in
an attempt to resolve this tension. Schaffrath [22], and
Studer et al.[23], both attempt to address the problem by
separating the encryption of the IPSec header and pay-
load, each with a distinct key, and augmenting the Net-
work Intrusion Detection system (NIDS) with Host-based
Intrusion detection systems (HIDS). While the “Two-Key
IPSec” approach does maintain the confidentiality of user
data it also requires the modification of the IPSec protocol
which would represent a substantial overhaul of widely
deployed software, much of which is built-in at the oper-
ating system level, and fails to address how preventing the
user from encrypting traffic using traditional (single key)
IPSec would be enforced.
Goh et al., in a series of papers exploring the problem
of intrusion detection in encrypted networks ([7],[10],[9]
and [8]) develop a framework that introduces a secret
sharing scheme together with a number of randomized
network proxies to ensure that both the intended receiver
and the NIDS obtain a decryptable copy of the user traf-
fic. However, this solution requires a significant increase
in the amount of traffic on the local area network (LAN),
at least doubling the traffic volume. The solution also re-
quires modification of every host on the network.
Irwin [11] proposes a central vault server for the stor-
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Table 1: Probability of detection > 40% for NIDS in various OS/attack pairs.
Pr{detect} DoS Probe R2L U2R Data
Solaris Expert-1 63%
Expert-2 53%
Expert-2 60%
Expert-3 50%
Expert-1 50%
Forensics 50%
Expert-1 100%
Expert-2 100%
Anomaly 100%
Forensics 73%
Expert-2 100%
Forensics 83%
NT Expert-1 69%
Expert-2 69%
Expert-1 80%
Expert-2 60%
SunOS Dmine 88%
Expert-1 63%
Expert-2 50%
Pclassify 60% Expert-2 67%
Linux Dmine 74%
Expert-1 84%
Expert-2 68%
Dmine 50%
Expert-3 60%
Expert-1 64%
Expert-2 44%
All Expert-1 46%
age of cipher keys for all encrypted services provided by
the monitored network. In his design the IDS is able to
retrieve the keys necessary to decrypt traffic for analysis
from the central vault server. It would seem that this cre-
ates a significant vulnerability to the confidentiality of all
the services provided on the network. One successful in-
trusion to the central vault server could render all encryp-
tion on the network useless.
2.3 Communities of Interest and Flow
Analysis
In this paper we investigate whether enough information
is contained within the encrypted data flows for a NIDS to
detect malicious behavior without decrypting the network
traffic. Past research on detecting communities of interest
and normal traffic patterns that do not rely on knowledge
of the content of the traffic can be leveraged to resolve the
problem of intrusion detection in encrypted networks.
Aiello et al., provide a particularly relevant
discussion[2]. This paper explores the ability of
community of interest (COI) analysis to characterize
and predict the behavior of hosts within a data network.
If normal behavior can be characterized, so too can
anomalies. The methodology of evaluating various
aspects of COIs of hosts within an IP network, provided
in this paper, offers a promising avenue to approach the
problem of intrusion detection on an encrypted network.
Much additional research has been done on the extent
to which analysis of NetFlow records can provide assis-
tance in both defining the normal state of a network and
in detecting abnormalities. Bin et al.[5], propose “a real-
time anomalous traffic monitoring module of a NetFlow
monitoring system with a stable matching pattern algo-
rithm and two traffic statistic based intrusion detection
algorithms - one algorithm is based on variance similar-
ity and the other based on Euclidean distance to detect
worms and other malicious attacks.” Their system demon-
strates the usefulness of flow record analysis in intrusion
detection. While it is not written for traffic flows in an en-
crypted environment, the work that they have done does
provide a basis from which to begin the flow analysis of
encrypted traffic.
3 Finding the Needle in a Needle
Stack
The challenge of generalizing flow analysis to be relevant
to the more limited data set available in the presence of en-
crypted flows is not trivial. Even the definition of a flow
must be revisited in the presence of IPsec. A network
flow has been traditionally defined by at least a 4-tuple
compromised of the source IP address, destination IP ad-
dress, source port and destination port. In the presence of
IPsec the source and destination ports are not available for
analysis. Even the transport protocol is hidden by the en-
cryption, as the protocol in the IP header of an IPsec flow
is 50 (the protocol number for IPsec itself).
Figure 2 depicts the information that is contained in
IPv4 and IPv6 headers. This is the only information that is
available to a NIDS for analysis in the presence of IPsec.
And while the IP headers are available for analysis, some
of their fields are trivially uninteresting. As previously
noted, the IPv4 Protocol or IPv6 Next Header field will
always be equal to the IPsec protocol number. The Ver-
sion field provides no additional information for analy-
sis. Neither the IPv4 Type of Service nor the IPv6 Traffic
Class fields have been used widely enough to provide data
of interest. As such, in the presence of IPsec the NIDS is
limited to analysis of the source and destination addresses,
packet size and Time To Live in IPv4 or Hop Limit in IPv6
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for its characterization of traffic.
Our goal was to use the information that is available
for the analysis of traffic patterns to create a network in-
trusion system that could be trained to detect anomalous
malicious behavior without the need to decrypt network
traffic. While we were unable to create such a system we
were able to identify some trends that point in the direc-
tion of a solution. In this paper we describe that data set
used as the basis for our analysis, the techniques used to
analyze the data and the results of that analysis. We took
a parallel approach to the analysis of the data, separately
applying machine learning techniques to the data set as an
abstract and statistical analysis of the data based on char-
acteristics likely to differentiate normal and attack traffic.
Figure 2: IPv4 and IPv6 Header Fields
4 Data Analysis and Characteriza-
tion of Network Traffic
4.1 The 1998 DARPA IDS Dataset
While the consensus of the network security community is
that the DARPA IDS data sets and the derived 1999 KDD
Cup data are fundamentally broken, even the harshest crit-
ics generally acknowledge that there is no superior pub-
licly available data set relevant to the evaluation of IDS.
With that in mind, we acknowledge the shortcomings of
the source data used for our investigation and concede that
any definitive conclusion would require testing on addi-
tional data sets. However, as the nature of our work is
only to point towards avenues that appear to be fruitful in
analyzing encrypted traffic to identify intrusions, we do
not believe that the flaws in the source data detract from
the claims that we make in this paper. As a matter of fact,
the flaws in the source data rather make us more hopeful
that network intrusion detection is possible in the presence
of ubiquitous encryption. Because one of the published
flaws with the DARPA data set was the irregularity in the
Time To Live that allowed trivial differentiation of attack
traffic, we limited our analysis to packet length and IP ad-
dresses. Removing this variable from our analysis only
made the differentiation of attack traffic more difficult.
4.2 Analysis of Characteristics Likely to
Differentiate Attacks
4.2.1 Data Analysis Methodology
The analysis of the data set based on characteristics likely
to differentiate attack traffic was performed on an Ubuntu
Linux server running MySQL 5.1.58. The Linux wget
utility was used to download the daily archives from the
MIT Lincoln Laboratories website1. Extraction of the
archive files was scripted using Perl. Upon extraction the
only file used for import into the MySQL database was
the tcpdump file. The Linux utility tshark was used to ex-
tract the relevant fields from the packet header using the
following command:
tshark -n -T fields \
-e ip.src \
-e ip.dst \
-e ip.len \
-e ip.ttl \
-e frame.time_epoch \
-r tcpdump > headers
Database tables in the following format were created to
store the packet header data to be analyzed:
+--------+---------------------+------+-----+---------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default |
+--------+---------------------+------+-----+---------+
| src_ip | bigint(20) unsigned | YES | MUL | NULL |
| dst_ip | bigint(20) unsigned | YES | MUL | NULL |
| length | mediumint(9) | YES | | NULL |
| ttl | smallint(6) | YES | | NULL |
| ts | decimal(15,6) | YES | MUL | NULL |
| attack | tinyint(3) unsigned | NO | MUL | 0 |
+--------+---------------------+------+-----+---------+
The labeling information was also obtained from the Lin-
coln Laboratories website2. Because the attack instances
were not labeled on a per packet basis, a Perl script was
used to read the attack schedule file and populate the
attack field in the database tables. The logic for la-
beling the packets in the database was to assign a value
of 1 to source and destination IP pairs matching those in
the attack list near the time of the attack in the schedule.
A value of 2 was assigned to database entries where the
source and destination IP addresses were reversed. This
resulted in three categories of labels. Normal traffic was
labeled 0. Attack traffic was labeled 1. Replies to attack
traffic were labeled 2. Importing and labeling the data
1http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/ist/corpora/ideval/data/1998data.html
2http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/ist/corpora/ideval/docs/attacks.html
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in this manner allowed a number of analyses to be run
comparing the statistical characteristics of the available
parameters.
As was discussed earlier, because source and destina-
tion port are not available for analysis, an alternatemethod
of distinguishing a flow was required. For the purposes of
this analysis a flow was defined as a grouping of packets
sent from A to B within a specified time slice.
4.2.2 Analysis of Packet Size Variation
Given the limited set of variables available to differenti-
ate attack traffic in the presence of IPsec encrypted traf-
fic, a careful reasoning concerning likely differences is
required. One generalization that can be made regarding
attack traffic is that it is much more likely to be automated
than normal traffic. This recognition led to the inference
that it may well be the case that attack traffic is more uni-
formly sized within a given flow than normally occurring
network traffic.
The statistical examination of the data confirms this in-
ference. While there did not appear to be any discernible
difference in average size of packets in an attack than in
a normal traffic flow, the standard deviation of the size of
packets in an attack tended to be be much smaller than
that seen for normal traffic. A frequency distribution of
the standard deviations of packets size in a given flow for
both normal and attack traffic follows: As can be seen in
Figure 3: Degree of Packet Size Variation within a Flow
the preceding frequency distribution, standard deviations
of 50 bytes or smaller occru in only 60% of the normal
traffic flows and standard deviations in packet size as large
as 400 bytes occur in nearly 5% of normal flows. Con-
versely the stand deviation in packet size for attack flows
is 50 bytes or less for more than 95% of all flows.
4.2.3 Community of Interest Based Analysis
One analysis technique that seemed likely to be useful in
identifying attack instances was the identification of com-
munities of interest derived from typical host communi-
cation patterns. Aiello et al., provide an analysis that sug-
gests ”some stability in the COI for the community as a
whole” [2]. In our analysis we employed a variant of of
what Aiello et al., called a frequency based community of
interest. Based on the definition offered by Aiello et al. of
a frequency based community of interest:[2]
A host is considered to be part of the COI of a
target-host, if the targethost interacts with it at
least once every small time-period Z (the bin-
size) within some larger time period of interest
Y.
In attempting to apply this definition to the DARPA data
set, it was determined that one could more effectively cap-
ture membership in a legitimate community of interest by
both expanding the bin-size and looking at the percent-
age of bins in which the interaction occurred rather than
requiring interaction occur in every bin. This analysis
is based on the likelihood that communications between
a internal host and an attack source would be relatively
infrequent given the infrequency of occurrence of attack
traffic. However, the following graph showing the fre-
quency distribution of flows from A to B, does not appear
show any appreciable difference in distribution of attack
pairs and normal pairs. For this analysis Attack Traffic
was defined as any flow A to B such that at some point in
the data set an attack occurred form A to B.
Figure 4: Frequency of Occurrence of a Flow
This result was unexpected and further analysis of
the dataset showed that a large number of attacks were
sourced from IP addresses that were also used for a rel-
atively high frequency of normal traffic flows. It would
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be worth investigating whether this is common in live net-
work traffic or is unique to this dataset.
In addition to analyzing the regularity with which a
flow fromA to B is repeated over a longer time period, we
attempted to find ways to characterize the flows in ways
that would allow us to differentiate between normal and
attack traffic. One such attempt, the characterization of
packet size variation, was discussed in section 4.2.2. Our
analysis of the total number of packets transmitted in a
flow from A to B showed some distinguishing character-
istics of attack traffic. Unfortunately, the distinguishing
characteristics seem only to apply to trivial cases. You
hardly need a sophisticated intrusion detection engine to
notify that you are currently in the midst of a Denial of
Service attack.
Figure 5: Number of Packets within a Flow
As depicted in Figure 5 instances of receipt of hundreds
of thousands of packets in a single flow seem to be quite
unique to attack traffic. However, aside the obvious De-
nial of Service attacks, the frequency distribution of pack-
ets sent in a flow are rather similar for both attack and
normal traffic. The curve for the attack traffic is decid-
edly less smooth, but this likely a function of the smaller
sample size more than an underlying difference in actual
traffic pattern.
4.3 Inferring Intuition from Data Analysis
The other point of view from which the problem was ap-
proachedwas that of data driven learning. By studying the
intrinsic nature of the data, it might be possible to glean
insight about natural separations in the data, i.e. discern-
ing between “normal” and “malicious” traffic. Analysis
began by extracting the four-dimensional feature vector
feati for each packet i, as given in equation 1.
feati =


timei
srci
desti
leni

 (1)
4.4 Initial Exploration
An initial exploratory effort led to the production of the
graph in Figure 6, a plot of a series (or flow) of packets
for every host on the network. Each point represents a
packet and the color represents the nature of that packet
(blue=“normal”, red=“malicious”). It is evident that pat-
terns in the attack packets do exist, but it also evident that
nothing about a single packet would be useful in recog-
nizing an attack vector. So, more information must be
assumed, e.g. windowing in time or structure of the data
space. Since the statistical/parallel effort focused on the
time windowing, here the possibility of structure within
the data was considered.
By the assumption that there is underlying struc-
ture/patterns in the data, the problem can be formulated as
a manifold learning task. Many algorithms are available
to discover the salient topology of such an unknownmani-
fold. Of particular interest is a newer algorithm: Diffusion
Maps. This approach utilizes a random walk on a graph
constructed from the feature vectors. In this way, the true
structure of the data precipitates the mapping. The resul-
tant mapping then represents the data in Euclidean space
isomorphically, i.e. maintaining the relative structure be-
tween data points. In this form, many common geometric
and statistical tools become viable that would not have
been if the original non-flat feature space were exploited.
4.4.1 Diffusion Maps
The Diffusion Map technique is a non-linear dimension
reduction technique introduced in [15, 16] and is referred
to in this paper as the Diffusion Map. The Diffusion
Map first embeds raw data into a spectral graph frame-
work. The method for defining the ’nodes’ and ’edges’
that comprise the graph is application specific. Edges
provide a measure of ’similarity’ between nodes. This
measure should have these two properties: symmetry and
non-negativity. That is, the similarity between two nodes
should be the same regardless of which node is used as
a reference. The non-negativity is straightforward. The
name ”Diffusion” is a reference to the process of heat dif-
fusing through a medium[24]. Similar to the model of
heat diffusion, in this algorithm weights are assigned to
the edges of the graph, as related to a reference node, by a
random walk on the graph with a distribution that dimin-
ishes the farther away from the reference node the walk
progresses.
6
Figure 6: Network packets (normal and malicious) as a function of time for each host.
Figure 7: Flow chart representing the Diffusion Map al-
gorithm.
With these weights considered as probabilities, one can
form a transition probability matrix, a Markov Matrix,
representing the data as it lies on the manifold. When the
assumed existence of the manifold holds, the eigenvectors
of the normalized Markov matrices embed the graph into
a Euclidean space. The algorithm for the Diffusion Map
used in this paper is succinctly outlined in [4]. The overall
notion of the technique is depicted in Figure 7. We refer
the reader to [15] and [16] for the complete details of the
Diffusion Map method.
We implemented the Diffusion Map technique using
the algorithm detailed in [4], choosing the weights w(i,j,),
using a Gaussian distribution, described in Equation 2 be-
low, where the indicated norm is the Euclidean, L2, dis-
tance as also chosen in [16] and [4].
e
−‖xi−xj‖
2
ǫ (2)
By appropriately normalizing these edge weights, the
transition probabilities for a random walk on the graph
were determined. These transition probabilities were then
formulated as a Markov matrix. Thus, by determining the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of this matrix one can em-
bed the graph into Euclidean space using the Diffusion
Map given by Equation 3 to achieve dimension reduction
to a space intrinsic to the data.
Ψt : x 7→ (λ
t
2ψ2(x), λ
t
3ψ3(x), . . . , λ
t
m
ψm(x))
T (3)
Here m(t) is the number of terms retained to define the
diffusion map and embed the data into the Euclidean
space Rm(t), λi are the eigenvalues, ψi are the eigenvec-
tors, and t is the exponential of the resulting eigenvalues.
The difficult part of using the Diffusion Map technique is
finding the appropriate value for ǫ, the diffusion-distance
tuning parameter and t, the exponent of the eigenvalues.
As ǫ increases, the edge weight increases, and as t in-
creases, the spectrum decays at a greater rate[4].
The resulting three-dimensional mapping of the data
(Figure 8 did indicated that a very clear structure exists.
However, the same coloring scheme utilized in Figure 6
was employed and the “normal” packets completely oc-
clude the “malicious” packets. So, while the data has an
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Table 2: K-Means Clustering Accuracy
True Positive 83.30%
False Positive 3.12%
True Negative 0.46%
False Negative 13.30%
intrinsic structure that is not captured directly by the fea-
ture vector, it is not obvious that the structure is related to
the intent behind the packets.
4.5 Unsupervised Clustering Classification:
K-Means
The last method implemented in studying the intrinsic
nature of the data was a method popular in data-mining
problems: clustering. These techniques force a separation
onto the data set of a give order. The K-Means algorithm
is simple: initialize with K random points in the feature
space then 1)assign each observation to the cluster with
the nearest mean and 2)calculate the new clusters’ means.
This process is iterated until cluster assignments cease to
change. Since the desired distinction was “normal” vs.
“malicious” a K-value of two was set; this ensured that the
data was forced to separate into two clusters. This method
does not lend itself to visualization, but rather classifica-
tion. The labels assigned to the packets via the clustering
technique were compared to the truth labels providedwith
the data sets with the following results (Table 2). This ap-
proach, while showing a high accuracy, also exhibited a
higher false negative rate. So, clustering, as with Diffu-
sion maps, seem to arrive at the intrinsic structure of the
data, but more information is necessary to ascertain the
nature of that structure.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Both of our parallel efforts to analyze the structure and
distinguishing characteristics of the portion of the DARPA
1998 IDS dataset that would be available in the presnece
of encrypted flows lead us to conclude that Intrusion De-
tection Analysis limited to the IP header can be a signifi-
cant contributing factor in detecting attack traffic. The ap-
plication of the manifold learning technique (an unsuper-
vised/unlabeled approach), Diffusion Maps, was fruitful
in that some intrinsic structure of the data was indicated
given only the four variables: time, src, dest, and length.
However, due to the non-linear nature of the algorithm,
an inverse mapping to determine the crux of that structure
is not possible. To ascertain the structure, an unsuper-
vised clustering scheme was employed. This approach,
while it illustrated a separation in the data (possibly arti-
ficially), it was not the separation between ”normal” and
”malicious” packets that was desired. Further investiga-
tion of this relationship is warranted; specifically with a
manifold learning algorithm that exhibits a more tractable
inverse. The statistical analysis of normal and attack traf-
fic characteristics likely to differentiate the traffic types
did provide evidence that attack flows are more uniform
in packet size. While the community of interest analysis
based on the previous work of Aiello et al., [2] did not re-
sult in the anticipated level of success, additional work to
determine if this shortcoming was related to peculiarities
in the DARPA dataset is warranted.
Regardless, the results of our statistical analysis and
the application of the manifold learning technique lead
us to conclude that it is not possible to differentiate be-
tween attack traffic and normal traffic on a per packet ba-
sis without incorporating additional information. How-
ever, it does appear likely that in many cases relevant in-
formation could be fed into the system. In most enter-
prise networks significant knowledge about both the logi-
cal topology and functional requirements for hosts on the
network are readily available. Given the availability of
this information, less naive metrics could be utilized to
account for/include knowledge concerning the topology
of the network to directly influence the structure of the
learned manifold. Expected patterns of traffic could be
more readily identified based on a hosts known functional
role within the organization. One might reasonably ex-
pect that what constitutes a normal flow for a corporate
mail server would be dramatically different from a nor-
mal flow for a user workstation. With the ability to profile
normal flows customized to specific IP addresses or IP
ranges the intrusion detection system would have signifi-
cantly greater information form which to begin the anal-
ysis of the limited set of available variables. Additional
investigation of how best to group packets sequences into
a flow may also lead to improved performance in the abil-
ity of the community of interest analysis in distinguishing
between normal and attack traffic.
While we were not able to develop a system that could
learn to distinguish attack traffic from normal traffic rely-
ing on analysis of only the IP addresses, packet sizes and
arrival times we did obtain results that give some hints to
where future work in the area is likely to be fruitful.
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